For this Clarendon Paperback, Dr Griffin has written a new Postscript to bring the original book fully up to date. She discusses further important and controversial questions of fact or interpretation in the light of the scholarship of the intervening years and provides additional argument where necessary. The connection between Seneca's prose works and his career as a first-century Roman statesman is problematic. Although he writes in the first person, he tells us little of his external life or of the (...) people and events that formed its setting. Miriam Griffin addresses the problem by first reconstructing Seneca's career using only outside sources and his de Clementia and Apocolocyntosis, whose political purposes are undisputed. In the second part of the book she studies Seneca's treatment of subjects of political significance, including his views on slavery, provincial policy, wealth, and suicide. On the whole, the word of the philosopher is found to illuminate the work of the statesman, but notable exceptions emerge, and the links that are revealed vary from theme to theme and rarely accord with traditional autobiographical interpretations of Seneca's works. (shrink)

The mutual interaction of philosophy and Roman political and cultural life has aroused more and more interest in recent years among students of classical literature, Roman history, and ancient philosophy. In this volume, which gathers together some of the papers originally delivered at a series of seminars in the University of Oxford, scholars from all three disciplines explore the role of Platonism and Aristotelianism in Roman intellectual, cultural, and political life from the second century BC to the third century AD.

A volume which explores in detail Seneca's De Beneficiis. Divided into three sections, it looks at the historical and philosophical context of the work, its relation to Seneca's other texts, and concludes with a detailed synopsis of each book, accompanied by notes in commentary form.

A volume which explores in detail Seneca's De Beneficiis. Divided into three sections, it looks at the historical and philosophical context of the work, its relation to Seneca's other texts, and concludes with an in-depth synopsis of each book, accompanied by notes in commentary form.

This volume, which gathers together nine interdisciplinary papers delivered at a series of seminars on philosophy and Roman society in the University of Oxford, explores the role of Platonism and Aristotelianism in Roman intellectual, cultural, and political life from the second century BC to the third century AD.

Cicero was the greatest orator of the ancient world and a leading politician of the closing era of the Roman republic. These three dialogues here are among the most accessible of Cicero's philosophical works.

In the fourteenth letter to Lucilius, Seneca explains how to avoid physical danger and discomfort: the worst threats to the body come not from nature but from men in power; therefore safety lies in not giving offence. Ad philosophiam confugiendum est : the study of philosophy incurs neither envy nor contempt, provided that the philosopher pursues it peacefully and without ostentation.

In the fourteenth letter to Lucilius, Seneca explains how to avoid physical danger and discomfort: the worst threats to the body come not from nature but from men in power; therefore safety lies in not giving offence. Ad philosophiam confugiendum est : the study of philosophy incurs neither envy nor contempt, provided that the philosopher pursues it peacefully and without ostentation.

Mommsen invented the notion that the ancient sources provide clear evidence for placing the pre-Sullan laws affecting the iudicia publica in two distinct categories, i.e. laws affecting courts in general and laws affecting one court . Fraccaro demolished it, arguing that the term lex iudiciaria had no such precise meaning in the ancient authors and that all the laws to which it was applied, before the Lex Aurelia of 70, were, in fact, leges repetundarum.

Mommsen invented the notion that the ancient sources provide clear evidence for placing the pre-Sullan laws affecting the iudicia publica in two distinct categories, i.e. laws affecting courts in general and laws affecting one court. Fraccaro demolished it, arguing that the term lex iudiciaria had no such precise meaning in the ancient authors and that all the laws to which it was applied, before the Lex Aurelia of 70, were, in fact, leges repetundarum.